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Publicly, the United States positions 
itself as the world’s protector and enforcer of 
democracy. This role, however, is more 
preferential than universal. The Syrian 
Network for Human Rights (SNHR), the United 
Nations’ designated source for casualty 
information in the area, documented at least 
1,232 civilian casualties in Syria in Dec. 
2014.1 Of those, the Assad regime is 
responsible for 1,049, or more than 85 
percent.2 Meanwhile, the self-proclaimed 
Islamic State of Iraq and Shams (ISIS) was 
responsible for just over 5 percent of the 
civilian deaths in Dec. 2014.3 Although this is 
only a small portion of the five-year death toll, 
these statistics show that while ISIS has 
gained a reputation as the global synonym for 
brutality, it isn’t nearly as deadly as the Syrian 
government. To kill at such a rate and scale, 
the Assad regime employs frequent and 
indiscriminate airstrikes on civilian 
neighborhoods. By contrast, ISIS works on the 
ground to stage, most notably, summary 
executions and car bombs. ISIS’s small scale 
attacks, however, have drawn the attention of 
the U.S., while the most dangerous threat to 
civilians, Bashar Al-Assad, has been afforded 
the luxury of American diplomatic 
complacency.  
*** 
In Feb. 2011, in the southern Syrian city of 
Daraa, a group of children between the ages 
of 10 and 18 wrote anti-regime graffiti on the 
walls of a school.4 Echoing calls of the 
blossoming Arab Spring, they wrote, “The 
people want the fall of the regime. Your turn is 
coming, doctor.”5 The subsequent response 
from President Bashar Al-Assad was 
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unprecedented: security forces kidnapped, 
detained, and tortured the children for their 
dissent. When they were finally released their 
bodies showed signs of brutal mutilation 
including extracted fingernails, broken bones, 
and lash wounds. In response to this incident, 
the people of Daraa took to the streets in 
protest, and not long after, all of Syria erupted 
in support of them.  
To quell the dissent, the Assad regime 
unleashed a state-sponsored nationwide 
hellfire. The regime placed entire cities under 
siege where security forces, the primary 
apparatus of the state, targeted and killed 
countless unarmed civilians. Snipers were 
positioned atop buildings, daring anyone to 
travel outside the shadows. People were 
kidnapped from their homes and detained, 
never to be heard from again. Homes were 
pillaged and entire neighborhoods were 
destroyed by intense air artillery. Sexual 
violence was rampant. Bread, a staple 
government subsidy, was strategically 
withheld and then released to bait the starving 
population out from cover, where they would 
be shelled with barrel bombs. Electricity was 
cut, leaving people without heat during the 
winter. Internet and telephone use was 
severely restricted and monitored, and any 
infraction provoked possible detention. Like 
the long line of dictators before him, Assad 
reasoned that the most effective way to quell 
dissent was to kill all of those with a voice. 
The world watched and hesitated as 
Syrians were slaughtered without any means 
of protecting themselves. During this time, the 
rhetoric of the Obama administration 
suggested a genuine desire to support local 
democratic movements, consistent with those 
of the Arab Spring. In Aug. 2011 President 
Obama said: 
 
“THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN INSPIRED BY THE SYRIAN 
PEOPLES’ PURSUIT OF A PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO 
DEMOCRACY. THEY HAVE BRAVED FEROCIOUS BRUTALITY AT 
THE HANDS OF THEIR GOVERNMENT. THEY HAVE SPOKEN 
WITH THEIR PEACEFUL MARCHES, THEIR SILENT SHAMING OF 
THE SYRIAN REGIME, AND THEIR COURAGEOUS PERSISTENCE 
IN THE FACE OF BRUTALITY – DAY AFTER DAY, WEEK AFTER 
WEEK. THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT HAS RESPONDED WITH A 
SUSTAINED ONSLAUGHT. I STRONGLY CONDEMN THIS 
BRUTALITY, INCLUDING THE DISGRACEFUL ATTACKS ON 
SYRIAN CIVILIANS IN CITIES LIKE HAMA AND DEIR AL ZOUR, 
AND THE ARRESTS OF OPPOSITION FIGURES WHO HAVE BEEN 
DENIED JUSTICE AND SUBJECTED TO TORTURE AT THE HANDS 
OF THE REGIME. THESE VIOLATIONS OF THE UNIVERSAL 
RIGHTS OF THE SYRIAN PEOPLE HAVE REVEALED TO SYRIA, 
THE REGION, AND THE WORLD THE ASSAD GOVERNMENT’S 
FLAGRANT DISRESPECT FOR THE DIGNITY OF THE SYRIAN 
PEOPLE.6“ 
 
It was in this Aug. 2011 speech that 
President Obama explicitly called for Assad to 
step aside for the first time. It took six months 
of indiscriminant civilian killing to warrant this 
stance. The delayed response to the initial 
siege of Daraa is the first of many pivotal 
moments where the U.S. floundered. Even a 
cursory look at the conflict makes clear that 
the American policy regarding Syria has been 
a reactionary and inconsistent realpolitik 
mess. This strategy is commonly referred to 
as “leading from behind.” 
As the policy has evolved along with 
the ever-changing dynamics on the ground, it 
is clear that there are inherent contradictions 
between the moralistic rhetoric of policy and 
22 
 
the amoral empirical realities of policy 
implementation. U.S. government officials 
have publicly pledged their support of the 
Syrian people, called for the abdication of 
Assad, and stated that the use of chemical 
weapons is a red line that, if crossed, would 
provoke military intervention. The U.S., 
however, has delivered on none of these 
commitments. 
The discrepancy between promises 
and reality makes it seem as though the policy 
is a failure of implementation rather than 
conception. In truth, the Obama 
administration’s plan for Syria has not been a 
series of miscalculated missteps. The Syria 
strategy has done exactly what it was 
intended to do: maintain the status quo of 
instability in order to have leverage over Iran 
as well as to continue the expansion of 
counterterrorism efforts. In this regard, the 
conflict in Syria has been very little cost to the 
U.S. while providing incredible potential gain. 
*** 
After the U.S. spent two years declaring 
“Assad must go” without providing any 
substantial military aid to opposition groups 
like the Free Syrian Army (FSA), a vacuum of 
strategy and execution occurred when Assad 
began to use chemical weapons. When the 
first evidence of chemical weapon usage 
emerged, the Obama administration 
vacillated, signaling that it neither had the 
political will nor a military plan. This only 
emboldened Assad, who finally caught the 
attention of the international community when 
1,400 people were killed by sarin gas in 
Damascus in Aug. 2013.7 Developed in 1938 
as a pesticide, sarin gas is one of the most 
toxic and rapidly acting nerve agents. In its 
pure form, it is a clear, odorless, colorless and 
tasteless liquid that can be fatal just after one 
minute of exposure, even in low doses.  
President Obama and his advisers, led 
by Secretary of State John Kerry, immediately 
declared that the red line had been crossed 
and military action was imminent. Obama, of 
course, backed away from the red line, 
choosing to seek congressional approval first, 
later scrapping a strike altogether in favor of 
an international agreement to strip Syria of its 
chemical weapons. The “Framework for the 
Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons” 
included provisos that Syria provide a 
comprehensive listing of its weapons to the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons (OPCW) and sign the Chemical 
Weapons Convention.8 Both have yet to be 
finalized, and the expected mid-2014 
completion date has passed. Moreover, 
slightly less toxic chemicals like ricin and 
chlorine are not on the list of prohibited 
chemical covered by the disarmament 
agreement, and the United Nations reports 
that these chemical continue to be used in 
Syria today.9 
In order to carry out the agreement to 
destroy the weapons, the OPCW needs a 
reliable partner, and it has arguably found one 
in Assad, who appears to be going along with 
the plan, though at a leisurely pace. In this 
regard, Assad’s rise in legitimacy within the 
international community was contingent upon 
the chemical weapons deal. It essentially 
promised the Assad regime that the U.S. 
would not use military force in exchange for 
the destruction of certain chemical weapons 
and their facilities. This deal was considered a 
success in Washington because diplomacy 
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Not only is the 
presence of foreign 
militants part of 
Assad’s calculation, 
but he has also taken a 
step further to allow 
radicalism to breed 
within Syria. 
was able to rid Assad of his chemical 
weapons as well as prevent their use without 
military actions. This agreement epitomizes 
the delusional sweet-spot compromise the 
Obama administration is trying to strike 
between isolationist and interventionist policy.  
The immediacy of the international 
community’s response to Assad’s use of 
chemical weapons, however, is striking. It 
suggests not only the magnitude of chemical 
weapons being used, but that they threaten 
international order and state sovereignty. 
States are historically far more terrified of 
weapons that can, once deployed, backfire on 
them or fall beyond sovereign control than 
equally horrifying weapons, whose 
deployment and effects are more subject to 
the limitations states place on them. Assad’s 
use of chemical weapons was said to cross a 
red line because it irrevocably disrupted the 
lax standards set by the said community.  
The implications of this agreement, 
however, are disturbing. They give Assad the 
green light to continue systematically killing 
his own people with conventional weapons of 
war. These include, but are not limited to: 
barrel bombs, starvation, sexual violence, 
exposure to the elements, mass executions, 
targeting civilian neighborhoods and hospitals, 
torture, withholding subsidies, and indefinite 
detention. Assad, however, has publicly and 
repeatedly attributed this violence to armed 
foreign terrorist gangs since the beginning of 
revolution, a claim rejected by human rights 
organizations.10  
*** 
The FSA was founded on Jul. 29, 2011, six 
months after the siege of Daraa. The first 
signs of radical ideological groups emerged in 
Jan. 2012 when Jabat Al-Nusra, a faction of 
Al-Qaeda, released a public statement calling 
for armed struggle against the Syrian 
government. This was after 10 months of 
violent government suppression. It is not a 
surprise, though, that as the violence 
continued, foreign militants flocked to Syria in 
pursuit of their own agendas. As the historical 
trajectory of revolutions would suggest, the 
that longer violence continues, the more 
radical people become. This was Assad’s self-
fulfilling prophecy.  
Not only is the presence of foreign 
militants part of Assad’s calculation, but he 
has also taken a step further to allow 
radicalism to breed within Syria. WikiLeaks 
reports have shown that the Assad regime 
has strategically released political prisoners 
who are known to have radical ideologies.11 
Moreover, the regime is informally cooperating 
with these same radical militants. As reported 
by an anonymous source in the Telegraph, 
the regime presently has a financial 
relationship with ISIS. It has purchased fuel 
from ISIS-controlled areas.12 It’s also 
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particularly telling that radical groups — 
namely ISIS — and the regime are not fighting 
each other.13 Both the regime and ISIS are 
also occupied with fighting the FSA and killing 
civilians. 
Assad’s self-fulfilling prophecy was 
that the presence of radical militants, whether 
foreign or locally bred in his prisons, would 
undoubtedly muddy the reputation of the FSA 
as a moderate rebel group and provide a 
distraction from the crimes of the regime. The 
U.S.’s terrorist tunnel vision also plays well 
into Assad’s strategy.  It’s as if the mere 
presence of Islamic militants begets a 
narrative that the entire revolution has 
become a sectarian jihadist war. This, 
however, isn’t the case. There’s great diversity 
within the ideology of the umbrella group FSA, 
although the U.S. seems unable and unwilling 
to identify them.  
The CIA’s system of identifying 
moderate forces — which is antiquated and 
dysfunctional at best, disastrous at worst — is 
dictating the nature of the conflict entirely. The 
system, designed during the Cold War, isn’t 
able to fully identify moderate FSA units or 
individuals for several reasons. First, the 
system fails to understand and integrate the 
historical and contemporary regional 
dynamics or account for Syrian ethnic, tribal 
and religious dynamics.14 Second, the CIA 
does not have a physical presence in Syria 
and must rely primarily on secondhand 
information, or possible third party actors. 
Third, and most importantly, the inability to 
positively identify moderate units has 
amplified the distrust of the FSA, which has 
hampered the delivery of arms and equipment 
to it. Moreover, these structural inadequacies 
and ineptitudes aid in creating a perception 
that dramatically alters the narrative of the 
conflict and the international response it 
dictates. The flaws within the CIA system 
have in part caused the recent shift in policy 
towards the singular goal of combating 
terrorism with the help of Assad himself.  
*** 
The current U.S. policy is one of 
“uncoordinated deconfliction” with Assad's 
regime in the fight against ISIS, according to 
one U.S. official.15 It’s not a formal alliance, 
but the regime made a tacit agreement to 
avoid firing on coalition strike aircrafts. This is 
juxtaposed with long delays in the Obama 
administration's “train and equip” program for 
the Syrian opposition as well as the 
president's Oct. 2014 letter to Iran's Supreme 
Leader on unity against ISIS.16 These 
simultaneous interactions between peoples, 
state and non-state actors, and policies 
suggest that the United States is heading into 
a de facto alliance with Assad and Tehran 
against ISIS. Hence, the U.S. is able to 
maintain the status quo of the conflict in order 
to coordinate with Iran. In this regard, Assad 
and the U.S. share a common enemy in ISIS. 
This alliance is a blow to the FSA and 
the urgent support they need to counter both 
ISIS and Assad’s forces. If ISIS is weakened 
or defeated, a new power vacuum will exist in 
their stronghold. One possibility is that 
moderate opposition groups will be unable to 
fill it without international backing. And if they 
cannot, the Assad regime will. This is just as 
Assad intended in his deterrent strategy. 
Meanwhile, the existence of moderate forces 
continues to be overlooked by the U.S. The 
moderate forces that are worthy of attention 
25 
 
What remains clear is 
that the U.S. faces an 
impasse due to its 
irrevocable decisions, 
and whatever is to 
occur in the future will 
ultimately be decided 
by the will of the Syrian 
people. 
 fade into the background, or cease to exist at 
all, as bit players in a narrative wrongly and 
unfairly dominated. ISIS presents itself as the 
only alternative to Assad, and he purports to 
be the last line of defense against ISIS. As a 
result, both become stronger. 
But while Secretary of State John 
Kerry has acknowledged the symbiotic nature 
of the relationship between ISIS and the 
Syrian regime, the Obama administration has 
repeatedly refused to lay out actions that 
could force Assad from power. Asked on Nov. 
16 if the United States was actively discussing 
ways to remove Assad as part of a political 
transition, Obama answered simply: “No.” This 
suggests that because Assad poses no threat 
to the U.S., intervention will not occur.  Thus, 
it has become increasingly clear that in his 
realpolitik, balance-of-power containment 
strategy on Syria, President Obama is willing 
to accept Assad’s presence as well as 
coordinate with him, while the stated strategy 
has purportedly shifted from liberation to 
focusing entirely on counterterrorism. This 
policy seems to be self-defeating because it 
aims to combat terrorism with the help of a 
leader who commits state-sponsored 
terrorism. If the Obama administration 
continues this policy, it will merely contain 
ISIS, but not “defeat” or “destroy” the group. 
*** 
There should be no question as to 
whether the U.S. addresses the brutal reign of 
ISIS or the state-sponsored terrorism of 
Assad. Such a decision is shortsighted at best 
and debilitating at worst. A dichotomy does 
exist. There isn’t a diplomatic silver lining in 
this conflict. If the U.S. doesn’t demand the 
abdication of Assad and his regime, the U.S. 
is implicitly lending its support to a war 
criminal who has killed more than 200,000 of 
his own people. As it currently stands, the 
administration’s foreign policy response to 
Syria has left many questions unanswered. 
On one hand, the lack of impactful initiatives 
to deter the bloodshed over the past five years 
makes it clear that the U.S. policy did not aim 
to do so in the first place. If the U.S.’s 
response to this crisis continues in its current 
form, and Assad’s regime continues, violence 
and repression will persist. To this end, 
democracy will be impossible in Syria, and 
those who will truly bear the burden of such 
inaction will be the people of Syria. What 
exact proposals in need of reversing this 
conflict are uncertain, but what remains clear 
is that the U.S. faces an impasse due to its 
irrevocable decisions, and whatever is to 
occur in the future will ultimately be decided 
by the will of the Syrian people. 
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